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Drawing on corporate social responsibility (CSR) theory we investigated 
laypersons acceptability of senior executive compensation plans. We 
identified base salary, performance related bonus, fringe benefits, pension 
plans and compensation protection as relevant factors of compensation 
plans. The method was an application of information integration theory 
(llT). Results are that high acceptability is a consequence of a low base 
salary in the optimal context provided by the other factors. Performance 
based bonuses did not play a very important role. Exploratory analysis finds 
two patterns of points of views among participants. Practical and theoretical 
implications of our study are drawn.  
 
 
Recently, people have been concerned with the high levels of chief 
executive compensations. Quite frequently, executive compensations 
become controversial. Are these compensations excessive? What justifies 
these compensations? Justification of such large sums of compensations is 
traditionally linked to value creation (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). And in 
fact a significant portion of the rise in executive compensation results from 
exercising stock options, which were quite valuable when stock prices, rose. 
Yet, ordinary working-class people are regularly outraged by news about 
executives with seemingly unlimited paychecks.  
This study was set up to inquire how French people judge the 
acceptability of executive compensations as a function of the variables that 
are used to calculate compensations in large companies. The following 
sections introduce the reasons for moderating acceptability from a corporate 
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social responsibility (CSR) perspective. Then discuss relevant literature on 
compensation constituents and moral cognition.  
 
Why acceptability matters  
Acceptable compensations are morally superior. Dominant corporate 
social responsibility theorists hold the view that firms are, at least to some 
extent, accountable to society (Crane, 2008). CSR in practice means the 
voluntary contribution of businesses to sustainable development that goes 
beyond the legal requirements2.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   a	   company	  with	  executive	   compensations	   systems	   acceptable	   to	   laypeople	   acts	   more	  socially	  responsible	  than	  others.	  	  
Acceptable compensations can benefit to business. Even though it is 
controversial whether the motivation for CSR should be economic or 
normative (Wühle, 2007)3	   scholars have argued that a voluntary, non-
normative implementation of CSR increases benefits for the company itself. 
The reason given for this increase in benefits is the creation and valuation of 
intangible assets, such as trust, reputation, employee motivation and 
customer satisfaction.  
In the case of executive compensation it can be argued that it 
influences intangible economic variables because it is linked to workers' 
pay fairness perceptions (Marcos & Sales, 2006). The argument is as 
follows: People evaluate the fairness of their own pay, in large parts through 
comparisons with others (Dornstein, 1989). Since pay fairness is linked to 
employee outcomes (Shaw, 2001; Cowherd & Levine, 1992) and 
counterproductive behavior at work (CohenCharash & Mueller, 2007), 
executive pay that is perceived as unacceptable can directly harm a 
companies profits.  
 
Executive compensation  
We assume that from a laypersons' perspective it is dispensable 
whether, the "incentive zone" bonus curve follows a linear, a convex, or a 
concave function and focus on the constituents of compensation. Executive 
compensation packages are typically composed of (1) base salary, (2) 
                                                
2 We omit a detailed discussion of the terms corporate citizenship, sustainable business, and 
responsible business which make similar claims. 
3 The normative approach justifies regulatory pressure from governments and transnational 
institutions that require social responsibility from corporations, whereas the economically 
motivated approach, however, tries to establish an intrinsic motivation of companies for the 
implementation of CSR. 
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annual incentives or bonuses, (3) long-term incentives, (4) executive 
perquisites, (5) executive benefits (e.g., health insurance, life insurance, and 
pension plans) and (6) compensation protections (Kalinski, 2007; Murphy, 
1998).  
Base salaries are the fixed part of executive compensation. They are 
typically determined through benchmarking, based primarily on general 
industry surveys and supplemented by detailed analysis of peer firms. Firm 
size is traditionally an important determinant of base salary. For small sized 
firms in France the mean base salary is e51.281. Since this part is fixed it is 
particularly attractive to risk adverse executives.  
Virtually all for profit companies offer an annual bonus plan, paid 
annually based on a single year's performance. Those annual bonuses are 
largely explicit with a limited role for discretion. The most prevalent 
performance measure, as reported by surveys, is company earnings. Other 
measures include, EBlT, EVA, Sales, Customer satisfactions and stock 
price (Murphy, 1998).  
Long term incentives are mainly contracts which give the executive 
the right to buy a share of stock at a specified price after a pre-specified 
period. Those options are typically non-tradable and become exercisable 
over time. A majority of US grants have five to ten year terms for their 
major part. The main purpose of these contracts is to give an incentive for a 
long term management approach.  
In addition to monetary compensation, executives receive different 
types of perquisites. Such executive perks include the luxurious office, the 
executive dining room, special parking, use of a company airplane, 
company paid membership in high-class country clubs and associations, and 
executive travel arrangements. Many companies even offer executives tax-
free personal perks, including such things as free access to company 
property, free legal counseling, free home repairs and improvements, and 
expenses for vacation homes or boats (Kalinski, 2007).  
Since executives seek security after retirement, pension plans have 
also become part of compensation negotiations. Having lived with high 
revenues for several years during their active years, executives are eager to 
keep those revenues. Advantageous pension schemes have been designed 
that allow executives to perceive a fixed percentage of their salary after 
retiring.  
Another part of compensation schemes is the so called compensation 
protection or golden parachute a protection plan for executives in the event 
that they are forced out of the organization. Such severance frequently 
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results from a merger or hostile takeover of the company. The golden 
parachute is a significant onetime sum to the departing executive.  
 
Peoples' views  
Previous studies have shown that peoples' judgments of complex 
situations involving multiple pieces of information follow sets of rules used 
to combine each piece of information in a psychological integration process 
frst described by Andersons' llT (Anderson, 1982). This information 
integration process is documented in numerous everyday judgments (see 
Anderson (2008) for a review of situations), but also specifcally for moral 
decisions in medical ethics (Teisseyre, Vanraet, Sorum, & Mullet, 2010; 
Munoz Sastre, Peccarisi, Legrain, Mullet, & Sorum, 2007; Frileux, Munoz 
Sastre, Antonini, Mullet, & Sorum, 2004), confict resolution (Kpanake & 
Mullet, 2005), and legal situations (Kpanake, Dassa, Sorum, & Mullet, 
2013). To the best of our knowledge this study is the first to investigate 
executive compensations, and to a larger extent business ethics.  
Our prediction is that the integration process that participants use to 
combine information about all components of executive compensations is a 
complex one. The term complex, expresses the view that we expected the 
different pieces of information about executive compensation to interact.  
Studies on moral issues involving acceptability judgments have 
shown that different points of views exist in many cases. Kamble, Ahmed, 
Sorum, and Mullet (2013), for example, have investigated the acceptability 
of actively ending the lives of newborns with genetic defects amongst 
populations from India and Kuwait. Using cluster analysis techniques they 
identified four groups of people using different rules for their judgment. 
Those rules could, at least in parts, be attached to religious ideologies 
present in the two countries. Another study has identified two clusters in 
judgments of the acceptability of physician assisted suicide (PAS) Kpanake 
et al. (2013). One judged PAS always unacceptable, whereas the other made 
judgments depending on the circumstances. In a second step those clusters 
were then analyzed in relation to two populations: Lay people and health 
professionals. 
Based on those findings our second prediction is that French peoples' 
views on executive compensation acceptability can be segmented in groups. 
Each group would follow distinct rules to combine the variables that 
constitute a compensation plan. We further speculate that these views can 
be linked to ideological and/or moral conceptions.  
In a nutshell, our study aims at revealing the rules laypersons use to 
judge the acceptability of executive compensations. In a second step we aim 
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to reveal the underlying moral positions of these general rules. Our results 
provide corporate social responsibility practitioners and theorists with 
socially acceptable designs of executive compensation schemes.  
METHOD  
As in the many studies conducted in the feld of empirical ethics (see 
Kpanake & Mullet, 2011; Nann et al., 2012; Teisseyre, Mullet, & Sorum, 
2005), the method was an application of Functional Measurement 
(Anderson, 2008). The study was approved by the Ethics and Work 
laboratory of the lnstitute for Advanced Studies, Paris, France.  
 
Participants.	  The participants were unpaid volunteers recruited and 
tested by one student trained in the application of Anderson's methodology. 
Participants were contacted individually, explained the study, and asked to 
participate. Subsequently, the experimenter obtained informed consent and 
arranged when to administer the experiment. Of the 92 persons contacted, 
53 (57.6%) participated (MAge	  =	  23; 29 women, 24 men).  	  
Materials.	   The material consisted of 54 cards. The vignettes were 
composed according to a three within-subject factor design: Base Salary 
(€30.000, €60.000, €90.000) * Bonus (2%, 4%, 6% of annual turnover, or 
2% 1 year + 2% 5 year average turnover) * Supplementary benefits (All 
small, High fringe benefits, high fringe + pension plan, High fringe + 
pension plan + compensation protection), 3 * 4 * 4. 	  
Under each vignette was the question, "To what extent do you think 
that such a bonus policy is acceptable?" The rating scale was a 10-point 
scale with a left-hand anchor of "Certainly not" (1) and a right-hand anchor 
of "Certainly yes" (10). An example vignette is the following:  
Mr	  Ramolin	  is	  CEG	  of	  Sanobi	  company	  (≈	  12.000	  workers,	  in	  France	  
and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world).	   His	   base	   salary	   is	   €30.000.	   In	   addition,	   he	  
receives	   2%	   of	   the	   annual	   turnover.	   This	   bonus	   is	   calculated	   on	   the	  
turnover	   in	   the	  previous	  year.	  There	   is	  no	  bonus	   calculated	  on	  a	   longer	  
timeframe	   that	  would	   incentivize	   a	   sustainable	  management	   approach.	  
He	   has	   only	   little	   fringe	   benefits	   (a	   company	   car).	   He	   has	   an	   average	  
manager’s	   pension	   plan.	   In	   case	   of	   early	   departure,	   he	  would	   receive	   a	  
bonus	  of	  only	  €50.000.	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The cards were arranged by chance and in a different order for each 
participant. The participants answered additional questions about age, 
gender, and educational level.  
 
Procedure.	  The site was either a vacant room at the university. Each 
person was tested individually. The session had two phases. In the 
familiarization phase, the experimenter explained what was expected, and 
presented each participant with 18 vignettes taken from the complete set. 
For each vignette, the participant read it out loud, was reminded by the 
experimenter of the items of information in the vignette, and then made an 
acceptability rating by putting a mark on the rating scale. After completing 
the 18 ratings, the participant was allowed to look back at his or her ratings 
and to compare and change them. In the experimental phase, each 
participant gave ratings for the whole set of 36 vignettes, working at his or 
her own pace, but was no longer allowed to look back at and change 
previous responses. In both phases, the experimenter made certain that each 
participant was able to grasp all the necessary information before making a 
rating. 	  
The participants took 20 to 40 minutes to complete both phases. The 
experimental phase went quickly because they were already familiar with 
the task and the material. Participants knew in advance how long the 
experiment would last. They did neither complain about the number of 
vignettes they were required to evaluate, nor about the credibility of the 
proposed situations. They then completed the questionnaires.  
RESULTS  
For each of the 54 scenarios in the experimental phase, the distance 
was measured between the left anchor (0) and each answer, given on the 
rating scale. All subsequent analysis was based on these measures of 
distance. The overall mean value of all the ratings was 4.46; that is, close to 
the center of the response scale. The lowest mean rating, 1.88, and the 
highest mean rating, 7.54, were quite distant from the possible minimal and 
maximal answers (1 and 10). There was thus neither ceiling nor floor effect 
to complicate the interpretation of the results. In all subsequent analysis age 
and gender were controlled for.  
To analyze the general pattern of acceptability judgments we 
conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on the raw data. The design 
was Base salary * Bonus * Extras, 3 * 4 * 4. Because of the multiplicity of 
comparisons, the significance level was set at .05.  
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All three factors had significant effects (see Table 1). A lower base 
salary was more acceptable. Post-hoc analyses, using the Tukey honestly 
significant difference test, showed that the mean acceptability value 
observed when the base salary of a CEO was €30.000, acceptability was 
greater (M 5.65, SD .19), then when it was €60.000 (M 4.52, SD .1) and €90.000 (M 3.47, SD .11).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overall people find compensations with a little base salary 
and few extras most acceptable. Increasing extras and base salary 
continually deteriorates acceptability. 
 
 
Extras were also a significant factor of CEO compensation 
acceptability, p < .001. Mean acceptability was greatest when there were 
only little extra compensations (M 5.9, SD .12). When large fringe benefits 
(M 4.8, SD .13), large fringe benefits and a generous pension plan (M 4.2, 
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SD .10), large fringe benefits, a generous pension plan and a compensation 
protection (M 3.15, SD .15) were added acceptability continually decreased.  
Performance based bonuses were significant, p < .001 but accounted for 
little variance. When the performance bonus was 2% of turnover, mean 
acceptability was highest (M 4.79, SD .11). It was lowest when 
performance bonus was 6% of turnover (M 4.32, SD .10). 
However, the difference in means is only .47. The 2% 1 year + 2% 5 
year sustainable bonuses were both not different from the other conditions 
in post-hoc analysis.  
Four interaction effects were significant (cf. Table 1). The highest 
interaction effect involved all three factors and is shown in Figure 1. When 
there was a little base salary, a small performance based bonus and few 
extras; acceptability was highest (M 7.55, SD .16). It was lowest when €90.000, 6% and large extras were granted to executives. However the 
opacity of the interactions (for example the effect of a long term bonus is 
reversed, when base salary is high, fringe benefits and pension plans are 
granted) makes interpretation intricate.  
 
 
Table1: Repeated-measures analysis of variance with Effect Sizes.  
  	  
 
This kind of pattern is most likely due to the presence of multiple 
ideologies. That is the different groups of participants follow separate, 
eventually conflicting rules during the information integration process. 
Recent research has revealed such pattern in many areas related to ethical 
questions (Kpanake & Mullet, 2011; Nann et al., 2012; Kamble, Sorum, & 
Mullet, 2012) and we shall address this issue in the second part of our 
analysis.  
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Two points of view  
In order to identify groupings of participants, a cluster analysis was 
performed on the raw data in accordance with Hofmans and Mullet (2011) 
recommendations. That is, we used k-means clustering (Euclidean 
distances), a nonhierarchical centroid based method. This technique uses all 
data points and, moreover, is less susceptible to outliers and the distance 
measure used than hierarchical cluster techniques.  
Two clusters of participants were identified. They are shown in Figure 
2, with mean acceptability rating pooled across levels of base salary and 
extras. Responses of the first cluster were mostly on the left hand side of the 
scale (M 4.13, SD .09). This cluster is shown in the left panel of Figure 2. It 
was named "Mainly Depends on Extras" because participants primarily 
respond to the extras that executives receive. Acceptability ratings in the 
two most favorable scenarios were the only ones that were slightly above 
the midpoint of the acceptability scale (M 6.43 and M 6.18). It did not 
matter to them whether the base salary was €30.000 or €60.000. Only very 
high base salaries are considered less acceptable. When there were large 
fringe benefits a generous pension plan and a compensation protection, 
acceptability never was greater than 2.63.  
The second clusters' acceptability judgments were well dispersed 
above and below the midpoint. This cluster is shown in the right panel of 
Figure 2. It was named "Mainly Depends on Base Salary" because 
participants in this cluster mostly react to information about the base salary. 
When the base salary is small the compensation is always acceptable, 
independently from the extras. However, if the base salary exceeds €60.000 
there cannot be any high extra compensation. In this case mean 
acceptability ratings are even lower than when there is a small base salary 
with all extra benefits. When base salary is €90.000 the compensation is 
always unacceptable.  
These visual impressions were confirmed by a multivariate analysis of 
variance, conducted on the raw data including Cluster as a between subjects 
factor. The design was "Cluster" * Base Salary * Performance Bonus * 
Extras 2 * 3 * 4 * 4. Significant coefficients are reported in Table 2, 
F(18/918) 3.5, p < .001.  
 
Linking compensations to sustainability  
Some companies have also started to implement business ethics 
scholars' recommendation of linking executive pay to the achievement of 
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sustainability related goals. For example, a bonus can only be granted if the 
company has reduced its' CO2	  emissions to a predefined level.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Acceptability ratings of the two clusters (left and right panel).	  	  	  	  	  
Research on peoples' judgments of pro-social behavior, however, 
paints a mixed picture. On the one hand it is believed to be a signaling 
device, in the sense that it is socially valued and individuals or companies 
can polish their image through pro-social actions (Anik, Aknin, Norton, & 
Dunn, 2009; Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009). On the other hand there seems 
to be a crowding out efect if the pro-social behavior is done for the wrong 
reason, namely financial gains (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010). Marketers call 
those negative effects of pro-social behavior if people attribute it to profit 
motives a green backlash (Crane, 2000).  
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Because those results are not directly concerned with executive 
compensation, and only little is known about why and when people attribute 
pro-social behavior to profit motives, we have no prediction as to the 
acceptability of executive compensations in firms that behave pro-socially.  
 	  
Table 2: Results of the multivariate analysis of variance: Cluster (2) x 
Base Salary (3) x Performance Bonus (4) x Extras (4). Cluster was 
introduced as an in between variable, base salary, performance bonus, 
and extras as repeated measures. Non significant coefficients are 
omitted.  
 
 
 
To explore the eventual influence of corporate pro-social behavior on 
executive compensations six vignettes of the design were duplicated. Then 
supplementary information stating that the company is a leader in 
sustainability and has considerably reduced CO2	   emission was added. 
Accordingly all scenarios were judged twice by participants once with and 
once without the socially responsible behavior of the firm.  
To test whether socially responsible behavior from firms makes 
executive compensations more acceptable we conducted a paired sample t-
test comparing the overall means of the six scenarios that included the CO2	  
story to the mean of the six scenarios that did not. However this analysis did 
not reveal any differences, p .483.  
Analysis of variance was conducted to explore inequality in variances 
between groups. The design was "Cluster" x CSR, 2 x 2. A significant 
interaction was found, F(1,51) 20,48, p < .001. It is show in Figure 3. 
Cluster 1 judges the acceptability of executive compensations more 
acceptable in companies that are leaders in corporate social responsibility 
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and CO2	   emission reduction (M 5.13) than in regular companies, p < .0. 
This is not the case for cluster 2, ns. Overall, Cluster 1 had higher mean 
acceptability, p < .001.  
DISCUSSION  
Laypersons acceptability of executive compensations was best 
explained by the general context provided through the amount of the base 
salary and extras. Further we detected individual differences between 
respondents views, expressed through distinct integration rules. When the 
whole sample was considered, for each extra that was removed from the 
compensation plan the acceptability judgments increased by the same 
amount. A lower amount of the executives’ base salary added to 
acceptability. Surprisingly the importance of the performance based bonus 
was weakest, and did not seem to follow a consistent pattern.  
Exploratory analysis revealed the presence of two groups of 
participants using distinct rules to integrate information about executive 
compensation. The "Mainly Depends on Extras" group found that 
compensations were more acceptable when there were fewer extras. The 
"Mainly Depends on Base Salary" thinks that executive compensations are 
more acceptable when the base salary is smaller. As compared to the first 
group they think that €30.000 and €60.000 are not equally acceptable. 
Extras seem less important for this group.  
This study has several limitations. First, the group of participants was 
a convenience sample of moderate size, and the participants were recruited 
on Toulouse universities campus, and thus relatively well educated. Second, 
the participants answered questions about scenarios and not to real 
situations. The use of vignettes is, however, useful as it permits statistical 
analysis that reveal how people weigh and combine information when 
formulating their judgments. Third, only the major components of executive 
compensations were considered while others were held constant. Additional 
studies should also be conducted on larger and more diversified samples, 
eventually from other countries. Considering supplementary characteristics 
of remuneration situations might allow to reveal more than two groups with 
different views on executive compensation as found in medical ethics 
(Kamble et al., 2012; Nann et al., 2012; Teisseyre et al., 2005), corporate 
social responsibility (Devinney, Auger, & Eckhardt, 2010), and socially 
responsible investments (Hoepner & McMillan, 2009).  
Exploratory analysis further revealed different views on the question 
whether executive compensation should be linked to sustainability 
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performance. The first group of participants, those who have generally 
lowered acceptability, does not think that executives with a good 
sustainability track record should receive extra considerations. Their 
compensation plans are judged exactly the same as the ones of their less 
responsible peers. The second group, people with generally higher 
acceptability of executive compensation, does think that executives of 
socially responsible firms are more acceptable.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Corporate social responsibility slightly increases acceptability 
of executive compensations for people that base their judgments mainly 
on the base salary.  
 
 
Economists have long found that it's not how much you pay but how 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990a). However their analysis has mostly concerned 
the mechanics of incentive structures and in how far interests of the firm are 
equal to the executive interests. Our analysis qualifies this finding by 
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providing preliminary evidence that the acceptability of executive 
compensation is not only concerned with the nominal amount of the 
compensation, but also with the compensation policy of a company, i.e. the 
variable we have manipulated.  
Our findings are relevant for academics and practitioners of corporate 
social responsibility. Workers perception of pay fairness is linked to many 
factors, such as employee theft, job satisfaction and product quality 
(Morand & Merriman, 2012), that are relevant in organizational 
management. Therefore, practitioners are encouraged to be alert to indi-
vidual differences about compensation plans in a companies' code of 
conduct (Crane, 2008). Further, a particular attention should be devoted to 
the interplay of the base salary and supplementary attentions granted to 
executives.  
Another issue is the question of responsibility for implementing 
socially responsible compensation plans. Scholars have discussed whether 
stakeholders, the interest groups to whom companies are accountable, are a 
restrained group of people. Are companies only accountable to people 
directly linked to the company, or in a wider sense, to any group who is 
affected by the corporation (Freeman, 1984). In the former case, the 
responsibility for socially acceptable compensations would become an issue 
of public policy measures such as salary caps. Thus government legislation 
on compensations could be another socially relevant aspect for peoples' 
views.  
The field of corporate social responsibility will find in our study 
preliminary guidance towards a democratic approach to socially responsible 
compensation plan design. Indeed, most theoretical approaches admit that 
firms do have obligations	   (Jones, 1980; Evan & Freeman, 1988), duties	  
Carroll (1991) and responsibilities	   (Wood, 1991) for social problems. 
Nevertheless most theories have failed, so far, to develop a practical 
framework for the integration of a correct view of human nature, business, 
and society, and the relationship between business and society (Crane, 
2008). Our findings are a first step towards such a democratic view.  
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